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I. Introduction
New section 163(j) strictly limits business 
interest expense (BIE) deductions to large (and 
possibly not-so-large) taxpayers. Generally, BIEs 
may only be deducted to the extent that they do 
not exceed 30 percent of adjusted taxable income 
plus business interest income. Section 163(j)(4) 
requires partnerships to calculate this limitation at 
the partnership level. In this report, I focus on how 
section 163(j) applies to partnerships. Given my 
focus, I leave to others a more comprehensive 
review of section 163(j) as a totality,1 as well as the 
coverage of S corporations. I will tend to give 
fairly short shrift to the portions of the statute and 
proposed regulations (REG-106089-18) that do not 
primarily apply to partnerships. For the most part, 
I assume the reader is well-versed in subchapter 
K. I begin by laying out some background to the 
enactment of section 163(j) and its application to 
partnerships.
II. Why Section 163(j)?
Why, after allowing BIEs generally to be fully 
deductible for generations, did Congress feel the 
need to enact section 163(j)? Surprisingly, the Tax 
Cuts and Jobs Act conference report, as well as the 
Joint Committee on Taxation’s explanation,2 have 
little to say on the subject. But there are likely 
three — at times overlapping — motivations for its 
enactment: the need for revenue, concerns about 
excessive leverage in the economy, and the need to 
avoid the distortions that would be caused by 
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In this two-part report, Schwidetzky 
examines how section 163(j)’s limitation on the 
business interest expense deduction applies to 
partnerships. This first installment considers 
what prompted the enactment of section 163(j) 
and explains why the statute’s operation in the 
partnership context is inherently complex. Part 
2 will navigate the proposed regulations’ 
complicated, 11-step system for partnerships 
and propose simpler ways to keep partnership 
and partner levels aligned for purposes of the 
deduction.
Copyright 2019 Walter D. Schwidetzky. 
All rights reserved.
1
See Fred Feingold and Yishaya Marks, “Interest Deduction 
Limitation: Matters of Principle or Principal?” Tax Notes, Mar. 18, 2019, p. 
1295.
2
JCT, “Technical Explanation of the Revenue Provisions of the House 
Amendment to the Senate Amendment to H.R. 1625 (Rules Committee 
Print 115-66),” JCX-6-18 (Mar. 22, 2018).
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keeping the old rules in light of new section 
168(k). New section 168(k), through 2023, allows 
100 percent of the cost of depreciable personal 
property to be deducted in the year of purchase if 
it has less than a 20-year recovery period (which 
pretty much covers the personal property 
waterfront). After 2023, the percentage of the cost 
that is deductible drops each year, from 100 
percent to eventually 20 percent, depending on 
when the property was placed in service.3 Section 
168(k) expires at the end of 2026 or 2027, 
depending on the type of asset at issue,4 but if 
history is any guide, it will not be allowed to fully 
expire.
The TCJA steeply cut some taxes, especially 
corporate taxes. Estimates vary as to the extent of 
the loss in revenue caused by reduction of the 
corporate tax rate in section 11 from a maximum 
of 35 percent to a flat rate of 21 percent. A 
common estimate is about $1.4 trillion in revenue 
losses.5 Total revenue losses from the TCJA also 
vary, of course, but are often close to the same $1.4 
trillion, suggesting that outside the corporate tax 
cut, the TCJA was close to revenue neutral.6 
Inasmuch as the TCJA also made other tax cuts, it 
needed to also raise revenue to keep the rest of the 
tax bill close to revenue neutral. One major 
revenue raiser is indeed section 163(j): According 
to the JCT, section 163(j) will generate about 
$253.4 billion in revenue between 2018 and 2027.7 
The House Ways and Means Committee, 
however, did not admit that the revenue need was 
a priority, and instead focused on the risk of 
excessive leverage in the economy:
The Committee believes that the general 
deductibility of interest payments on debt 
may result in companies undertaking 
more leverage than they would in the 
absence of the tax system. The effective 
marginal tax rate on debt-financed 
investment is lower than that on equity-
financed investment. Limiting the 
deductibility of interest along with 
reducing the corporate tax rate narrows 
the disparity in the effective marginal tax 
rates based on different sources of 
financing. This leads to a more efficient 
capital structure for firms. The Committee 
believes that it is necessary to apply the 
limitation on the deductibility of interest 
to businesses regardless of the form in 
which such businesses are organized so as 
not to create distortions in the choice of 
entity.
The Committee believes that limitations 
on the deductibility of interest should be 
applied to those businesses with the 
greatest levels of leverage. Such firms may 
pose the greatest societal costs in times of 
financial distress. Smaller firms are likely 
to impose smaller costs on the economy 
than larger firms. Additionally, smaller 
firms have limited access to public equity 
capital markets as compared to larger 
firms. Thus, the Committee believes it is 
appropriate to limit the interest 
deductions of only the largest taxpayers.8
If excessive leverage is the concern, why enact 
section 163(j) now? When corporate tax rates were 
higher, the potential benefit of leverage was also 
higher. An interest deduction at a corporate rate 
of 35 percent is more valuable than at a corporate 






See JCT, “Estimated Budget Effects of the Conference Agreement for 
H.R. 1, the ‘Tax Cuts and Jobs Act’ Fiscal Years 2018-2027,” JCX-67-17 
(Dec. 18, 2017) ($1.389 trillion); Penn Wharton Budget Model, “The 
Senate Tax Cuts and Jobs Act, as Passed by Senate (12/2/17): Static and 
Dynamic Effects on the Budget and the Economy,” at 3 (2017) ($1.435 
trillion); and Tax Foundation, “Preliminary Details and Analysis of the 
Tax Cuts and Jobs Act,” at 9 (2017) (static, $1.42 trillion). Using dynamic 
forecasting, which tries to predict changes in the economy brought about 
by changes in fiscal policies, even the conservative Tax Foundation 
acknowledges that the corporate rate reduction will cost $668 billion 
between 2018 and 2027. On the other hand, the less-conservative Penn 
Wharton Budget Model predicts revenue losses between 2018 and 2040 
of $4.185 trillion.
6
See supra note 5. The JCT and the Tax Foundation were close to $1.4 
trillion using a static model; the Penn Wharton Budget Model came in at 
about $2 trillion.
7
JCT, “General Explanation of Public Law 115-97,” JCS-1-18, at 437 
(Dec. 20, 2018). See also KPMG LLP, “New Tax Law: Issues for 
Partnerships, S Corporations, and Their Owners,” at 12-14 (Jan. 18, 
2018).
8
H.R. Rep. No. 115-409, at 247-248 (Nov. 2017) (House report).
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acknowledged that the reduced corporate rate 
“narrows the disparity in the effective marginal 
tax rates based on different sources of financing.” 
To worry about excessive leverage under these 
circumstances is a bit of a non sequitur. If 
Congress was truly concerned about excessive 
leverage, one would have expected it to act long 
before now, when rates were higher.9 Then again, 
this would not be the first problem that Congress 
was slow to address. In any event, if excess 
leverage has been a problem in the economy — 
and many think it has — the limitation is better 
late than never.10 But one suspects that revenue 
needs also played a major, if unwritten, role.
One of the bigger revenue losers in the TCJA 
is new section 168(k).11 The 2016 Republican 
“Better Way” plan, while again not directly 
addressing the revenue needs, did acknowledge 
an interrelationship between sections 168(j) and 
163(k):
The benefit of immediate expensing of 
business investment operates as a more 
beneficial and more neutral substitute for 
the deduction of interest expense 
associated with debt incurred to finance 
such investment. Allowing investments to 
be immediately written off provides a 
greater incentive to invest than is 
provided through interest deductions 
under current law; allowing both together 
would be distortive as it would result in a 
tax subsidy for debt-financed 
investment.12
And indeed, the distortion could be 
substantial if the old rules on business interest 
deductions are coupled with new section 168(k). 
A simple example: Assume a taxpayer at a 30 
percent marginal tax rate buys a $100,000 piece of 
new equipment for use in business. Under section 
168(k), the entire cost is deductible, saving the 
taxpayer $30,000 in taxes, for a net cost of the 
equipment of $70,000. Now assume section 163(j) 
was never enacted, business interest remains fully 
deductible, and the taxpayer borrows the entire 
cost of the equipment. The taxpayer receives a 
$100,000 deduction and a $30,000 tax savings with 
zero equity outlay. For simplicity, assume the loan 
has an interest rate of 5 percent and is interest-
only for five years when the principal becomes 
due. Each year the taxpayer pays $5,000 of (under 
the old rules) fully deductible interest, which 
saves taxes of $1,500, and thus has a net cost of 
$3,500 ($5,000 - $1,500).
In year 1, the taxpayer has total tax savings of 
$31,500 and $100,000 of equipment for use in its 
business, which cost it only $3,500 that year. Thus, 
the taxpayer has more in tax savings than its out-
of-pocket cost for the equipment. This tax 
arbitrage continues until the loan becomes due, 
because four more years of net interest cost of 
$3,500 per year is $14,000 — still less than the tax 
savings in year 1 (ignoring time value of money 
considerations).
Of course, in year 5 it comes time to pay the 
piper. At this point the math can become complex, 
and I will not burden the reader with it. But 
depending on interest rates, the time value of 
money, the taxpayer’s other investment 
opportunities, and tax rates, it is possible that 
even after paying back the $100,000 loan, the 
taxpayer is economically ahead on an after-tax 
basis because of the savings offered by section 
168(k) and the old interest deduction rules. That 
in turn could mean that the taxpayer effectively is 
buying the property for free (or even for a 
negative amount).
Taxpayers with no skin in the game do not 
tend to make optimal business decisions. The 
combination of section 168(k) and the old 
business interest deduction rules could easily lead 
to poor business decisions, the purchase of 
business assets that might not be truly needed, 
and excessive leverage in the economy. Thus, the 
9
Some have suggested that new deduction rules for business interest 
were motivated by a desire to limit transfers to related foreign 
companies. By paying interest on debt to a foreign entity, income can be 
lodged offshore at presumably lower tax rates. The difficulty with this 
argument is the same as with the leverage argument: It made more sense 
when corporate tax rates were higher. Also, I’m unable to find any 
written evidence supporting that interpretation.
10
See Mark P. Keightley and Molly F. Sherlock, “The Corporate 
Income Tax System: Overview and Options for Reform,” Congressional 
Research Service report R42726 (Sept. 13, 2012); Sven Langedijk et al., 
“Debt Bias in Corporate Taxation and the Costs of Banking Crises in the 
EU,” European Commission’s Directorate-General for Taxation and 
Customs Union working paper 50 (2014); and Serena Fatica, Thomas 
Hemmelgarn, and Gaëtan Nicodème, “The Debt-Equity Tax Bias: 
Consequences and Solutions,” European Commission’s Directorate-
General for Taxation and Customs Union working paper 33 (2012).
11
JCX-67-17, supra note 5 (revenue loss estimated at $86.3 billion).
12
Better.gop, “A Better Way: Our Vision for a Confident America,” at 
26 (June 24, 2016).
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concerns about the distortive effects of section 
168(k) are decidedly valid. The enactment of 
section 168(k) effectively forced Congress to 
address the BIE rules. Further, if the old rules 
caused the use of excessive leverage even without 
new section 168(k), one could argue that one 
benefit of section 168(k) (regardless of its other 
merits and demerits) is that it forced Congress to 
do what it should have done earlier.13
As I will discuss, section 163(j) contains an 
exception for small and medium-size businesses. 
The reason, according to the quoted language 
from the House report, is that small business has 
less of an impact, which is a doubtful assumption. 
Small businesses make up 99.9 percent of all 
companies and 97.6 percent of exporters.14 Small 
business, in the aggregate, is thus a huge part of 
the economy, and excessive leverage there can 
certainly create economywide problems. That 
said, small businesses have less access to capital 
than large businesses, and individuals often have 
to borrow funds or personally guarantee them to 
get necessary capital. If the interest deduction 
were taken away from small business, it could 
mean that a business that operated at a loss in 
terms of cash flow would have taxable income 
because interest payments would no longer be 
counted. There is also some backstop to excessive 
leverage for small business, because lenders will 
look at the creditworthiness of individual 
borrowers, and those borrowers will have less 
access to borrowed capital generally. It is not as if 
they can issue junk bonds. Thus, perhaps 
retaining the full interest deduction for small 
business is easier to justify than for large business.
III. Partnerships and Section 163(j)
Section 163(j) is complex generally, but it saves 
its most sublime tortures for partnerships in 
section 163(j)(4). There are at least three reasons 
for this extra complexity.
A. Partnership-Level Calculation
The first reason is that under section 163(j)(4), 
for partnerships, the section 163(j) restriction on 
the deduction of interest must be calculated at the 
partnership level. Under subchapter K, 
partnerships are normally not taxable entities, 
with all income and expenses flowing through to 
the partners. For that reason, normally any 
limitation on deductions is calculated at the 
partner level.15 For nontaxable entities, it is much 
easier to calculate deduction limitations at the 
owner level because that is the level at which 
income and expenses are taken into account and 
at which the tax is calculated. Applying a 
limitation at the partnership level essentially 
stands subchapter K on its head, treating the 
partnership as if it were a taxable entity for 
purposes of the limitation. But almost all of 
subchapter K assumes the opposite, and 
integrating the general rules of subchapter K with 
an entity-level tax rule is no small feat. Complex 
regulations were hard to avoid.
If it creates so much complexity, why did 
Congress enact section 163(j)(4), which has no real 
analog in subchapter K? Oddly, nowhere have I 
found a clear-cut explanation for why Congress 
enacted section 163(j)(4). Out of desperation, I 
even contacted someone in government with 
section 163(j) expertise, who could not give me a 
reason for section 163(j)(4). The answer may lie in 
section 704(b). If true, it provides a second reason 
for the complexity.
B. Section 704(b) Allocations
Section 704(b) permits disproportionate 
allocations of partnership items. For example, 
someone who contributed 10 percent of capital 
could be allocated 100 percent of depreciation 
deductions.16 Could partners manipulate section 
163(j) by how they allocate ATI and deduction 
items? This report is not the place for a deep dive 
into the section 704(b) regulations, but the answer 
is mostly no, assuming the partners play by the 
rules. As I tell my students, generally, for an 
allocation to be valid under section 704(b), on a 
present value, after-tax basis, at least one partner 
13
Note that section 168(k) alone can distort business decisions, 
encouraging capital investments over labor investments in a way the 
economy might not do in a more neutral tax universe. But that is getting 
a bit far afield for this report, and I will leave these complex economics 
issue to the economists.
14
See Mary Ellen Biery, “The Big Impact of Small Businesses: 9 
Amazing Facts,” Forbes, Oct. 22, 2017.
15
See, e.g., sections 465 and 469.
16
See Richard Lipton et al., Partnership Taxation, ch. 5 (4th ed. 2017).
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must be better off, and at least one partner must 
be worse off. And under some circumstances, the 
regulations look not only at the tax year in 
question, but up to four future years as well.17 If 
the partnership indefinitely allocates more ATI to 
one partner and more ATI deductions to other 
partners, the allocation likely will be valid under 
these standards — and also inoffensive.
If someone receives a valid allocation of ATI, 
why not give that person more BIE deductions? 
But why would the other partners allow one of 
their own to receive most or all ATI items? True, 
less income means fewer taxes in the short run, 
but it can also mean less money in a partner’s 
pocket. More ATI may not only mean more 
taxable income, but it also may mean a larger 
capital account increase, larger distributions, and 
a bigger payout on liquidation (although 
liquidation that is far off in the future may be of 
limited relevance). So it might not be easy to get 
the other partners to play ball in many contexts, 
although hardly all contexts. In a family 
partnership, for example, the parents/general 
partners can typically arrange initial allocations 
any way they want. But those allocations would 
still have to pass muster under the section 704(b) 
regulations.
Thus, section 704(b) does not provide a 
satisfying explanation for section 163(j)(4), at least 
for partners playing by the rules. But, of course, 
partners do not always play by the rules. One can 
easily imagine a situation in which a partner is 
given a temporary increase in ATI to get a partner 
over some tax hurdle that arose outside the 
partnership. Temporary allocations designed to 
give partners short-term tax advantages typically 
do not pass muster under the section 704(b) 
regulations because they violate the substantiality 
rule or the rules for partners’ interests in the 
partnership, but that does not mean that those 
allocations would not happen.
It is generally acknowledged that the IRS does 
not have the personnel to adequately audit 
partnerships, that partnership audits are 
relatively uncommon, and that IRS agents rarely 
have sufficient expertise in partnership tax law. 
Indeed, partners could be inclined to push the 
planning envelope and engage in the suggested 
temporary allocations, knowing that an audit is 
unlikely. The best argument for calculating 
section 163(j) at the partnership level is not its 
theoretical underpinnings, which are shaky at 
best, but rather pragmatism: It may make the law 
easier for the IRS to enforce. With the 
deductibility of BIE determined at the partnership 
level, on the other hand, there is not much to 
game. Under section 163(j)(4) and the proposed 
regulations, aggregate allowed and disallowed 
BIEs at the partnership level must be matched by 
the aggregate deductions and carryforwards at 
the partner level. As Part 2 of this report will 
show, if gaming the system was the concern, 
section 163(j)(4) provides an effective solution.
Further, I have no doubt that some gaming of 
the system would go on if section 163(j)(4) had not 
been enacted. Whether it would occur enough to 
justify the enactment of a code provision as 
complex as section 163(j)(4) and the associated 
regulations is dubious, however. To keep the 
partnership and partner levels aligned for BIE 
deduction purposes, the proposed regulations 
create a highly complex 11-step system. I view 
complexity as an evil that should be avoided 
whenever possible. Is there a simpler way of 
addressing the problem? I believe so, as I discuss 
in Part 2 of this report. In that final section I also 
give an example of the application of section 
704(b) in the section 163(j) context.
C. Tax Shelter Carveout
The complexity added by the third reason is 
not that great, compared with the others, but in 
exchange it may end up being the most 
problematic. As noted, Congress did not feel that 
the new rules should apply to small business. In 
addition to the discussed economic problems, 
Congress may have appreciated that the 
complexities surrounding section 163(j) could 
overwhelm small business. Whatever the 
motivation, section 163(j)(3) contains a fairly 
generous exemption for small and medium-size 
businesses. Generally, a taxpayer is not subject to 
section 163(j) for a given tax year if its average 
17
See id. at sections 5.03 and 5.04.
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annual gross receipts for the three previous years 
do not exceed $25 million.18
But the $25 million exemption does not apply 
to tax shelters prohibited from using the cash 
method of accounting under section 448(a)(3). As 
I will discuss in more detail later, the definition of 
tax shelter is so broad that it potentially includes 
most sophisticated partnerships. Likely, most of 
these partnerships typically would not be thought 
of as traditional tax shelters, at least if a tax shelter 
is defined as an undertaking whose primary 
purpose is to reduce taxes as opposed to 
operating a legitimate business. Yet, many 
sophisticated cash-basis partnerships with gross 
receipts of less than $25 million could be fully 
subject to section 163(j) with all its complexities.
IV. The Non-Partnership Fundamentals
As noted, my focus is on how section 163(j) 
applies to partnerships. For the un- or under-
initiated, I briefly review the fundamentals of 
section 163(j).
The House report as well as the proposed 
regulations provide that the section 163(j) 
limitation should be applied after other interest 
disallowance, deferral, capitalization, or 
limitation provisions apply.19 Only interest that is 
still deductible after applying these provisions is 
subject to section 163(j). Interestingly, however, 
the proposed regulations provide that section 
163(j) applies before sections 461(l), 465, and 469.20 
The preamble provides little in the way of 
justification for this. It notes that the pre-TCJA 
section 163(j)(7) provided for this treatment,21 but 
there is no such language in the current version of 
section 163(j). Further, old section 163(j) was a 
very different code subsection, denying the 
deduction of BIEs on specific related-party debt of 
corporations with high debt-equity ratios. 
Relying on the old section 163(j) to provide the 
justification for this rule in the proposed 
regulations is — take your pick — inexplicable or 
specious. If the House report were legally binding 
(it is not), it seems that section 163(j) should be 
applied after sections 461(l), 465, and 469.
That said, there is little question that the IRS is 
right on the merits. The three code sections 
typically apply to net losses and thus would be 
awkward to apply before a code section like 
section 163(j) that limits a deduction used in 
computing net losses. Further, these three code 
sections apply at the partner level, whereas the 
initial section 163(j) calculation is made at the 
partnership level. It would be awkward, to say the 
least, to apply a partner-level limitation before a 
partnership-level limitation. The partnership 
would have to communicate with the partners, 
figure out which, if any, of the other three code 
sections apply, and somehow integrate it with the 
partnership’s application of section 163(j).
Making the process even more complex is that 
the order in which these three code sections must 
be applied is section 465, section 469, and finally 
section 461(l).22 One partner could be stopped at 
section 465, another at section 469, and still 
another at section 461(l). Also, all three code 
sections in some fashion allow the disallowed 
losses to be carried forward. Would section 163(j) 
be reapplied downstream to a previously 
disallowed loss that became deductible? All of 
this sounds like an even bigger nightmare in the 
making. Thus, although the proposed regulations 
seem to be at disjuncture with the House report, 
the reality is that the IRS may have had little 
choice, and it is hard to see who would want to 
challenge the IRS in this regard.
Other rules limiting the deduction of interest 
do not tend to carry as much baggage. For 
example, the capitalization rules of section 263A 
prevent the deduction of interest outright. It is not 
a problem to apply section 163(j) after code 
sections that take interest payments off the table. 
The proposed regulations note that section 
163(e)(3) and (5)(A)(ii) (original issue discount 
rules), section 267(a)(2) and (3) (matching 
18
Note the difference between gross receipts and gross income. Gross 
receipts minus the cost of goods sold equals gross income. Generally, 
commonly controlled businesses must be aggregated when calculating 
gross receipts. See sections 163(j)(3), 448(c), and 52(b). See also preamble 
to REG-106089-18, 83 F.R. 67490, at 67509-67510 (Dec. 28, 2018).
19
See H.R. Rep. No. 115-409, at 249; and prop. reg. section 1.163(j)-
3(b).
20
Prop. reg. section 1.163(j)-3(b). Section 461(l) provides an overall 
loss limitation rule for noncorporate taxpayers ($250,000 per year for 
single taxpayers and $500,000 per year for taxpayers filing jointly). It 
applies after the other two code sections. Section 465 contains the at-risk 
rules. Section 469 contains the passive loss rules.
21
See preamble to REG-106089-18, 83 F.R. at 67503.
22
See Lipton et al., supra note 16, at ch. 4.07.
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deduction and income between related parties), 
section 1277 (accrued market discount), and 
section 1282 (deferral of interest deduction on 
short-term obligations) all apply before section 
163(j). But again, none of these has a meaningful 
partner-level interaction; they can all be resolved 
at the partnership level without ever speaking to 
a partner. That said, the IRS was not able to escape 
addressing all non-section 163(j) partner-level 
adjustments, as I discuss later.
Under section 163(j)(1), the amount allowed as 
a deduction for BIEs may not exceed the sum of:
A. the business interest income of the 
taxpayer for the tax year (gross of BIEs);
B. 30 percent of the ATI of the taxpayer for 
the tax year; and
C. the floor plan financing interest of the 
taxpayer for the tax year (which I will 
diligently ignore for the balance of the 
report).
The amount of any business interest not 
allowed as a deduction for any tax year because of 
section 163(j)(1) is treated under section 163(j)(2) 
as business interest paid or accrued in the 
succeeding tax year, subject to the same rules.
BIE means any interest paid or accrued on 
indebtedness properly allocable to a trade or 
business. The term does not include investment 
interest (within the meaning of section 163(d)).23 
Prop. reg. section 1.163(j)-1(b)(20)(iii)(I) provides 
that guaranteed returns on capital are treated as 
BIEs. If finalized, this regulation could cause 
allocations of preferred gross (or net) income and 
related distributions to receive greater scrutiny. 
Guaranteed payments are commonly deductible 
to the partnership in computing partnership 
taxable income (relevant, for example, in 
computing partners’ outside bases under section 
705). In response to how guaranteed payments on 
capital would be treated, partnerships may move 
to a system of non-guaranteed preferred returns, 
but the loss of the deduction would have to be 
assessed. Often it would be of little significance, 
but there is no substitute for running the 
numbers.
Business interest income means the amount of 
interest includable in the taxpayer’s gross income 
for the tax year that is properly allocable to a trade 
or business. Logically, the term does not include 
investment income within the meaning of section 
163(d).24 The proposed regulations do not add 
much to this definition; they simply state that 
business interest income means interest income 
that is properly allocable to a non-excepted trade 
or business (defined later).25 Does interest income 
on a business bank account constitute business 
interest income? Neither the statute nor the 
proposed regulations provide an answer.
Under section 163(j)(7), the term “trade or 
business” does not include:
i.   the trade or business of performing 
services as an employee;
ii.  any electing real property trade or 
business;
iii. any electing farming business;
iv. the trade or business of the furnishing or 
sale of electrical energy, water, sewage 
disposal services, gas, or steam through 
a local distribution system; or
v.  transportation of gas or steam by pipeline, 
if (to be brief) rates are regulated by a 
state, the federal government, or other 
political body.
In the lingo of the proposed regulations, a 
business engaged in any of the activities listed in 
i-iv is called an “excepted trade or business” 
holding “excepted assets”; any other trade or 
business is, inescapably, a “non-excepted trade or 
business” holding “non-excepted assets.”26 
Generally, in this report I assume that a 
partnership conducts only a non-excepted 
business and holds only non-excepted assets. If a 
partnership holds both, the proposed regulations 
generally require that a proportionate allocation 
be made between the excepted and non-excepted 
assets.27
23
Section 163(j)(5). Notice 2018-28, 2018-16 IRB 492, stated that 
Treasury and the IRS intend to issue regulations clarifying that, solely for 
purposes of section 163(j), for a C corporation taxpayer, all interest paid 
or accrued by that C corporation on its indebtedness will be BIE within 
the meaning of section 163(j)(5), and all interest on indebtedness held by 
the C corporation that is includable in its gross income will be business 




Prop. reg. section 1.163(j)-1(b)(3).
26
Prop. reg. section 1.163(j)-1(b)(7) and (8).
27
Prop. reg. section 1.163(j)-10(b)(4)(ii).
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The exception for an “electing real property 
trade or business” is highly important. The term 
means any trade or business described in section 
469(c)(7)(C) that makes the election.28 Section 
469(c)(7)(C) in turn states that a real property 
trade or business means any real property 
development, redevelopment, construction, 
reconstruction, acquisition, conversion, rental, 
operation, management, leasing, or brokerage 
trade or business. This definition is broad so that 
one can say that real property businesses are 
generally exempt from section 163(j) if they make 
an election out. Once made, the election is 
irrevocable. To except real property business from 
the application of section 163(j) is to except a large 
segment of the economy.
Of course, the real estate industry can have 
excess leverage as much as any other economic 
industry. If, as the House report suggests, the 
reason for section 163(j) was to prevent excess 
leverage, why allow such a large segment of the 
economy to elect out — especially one that has 
major issues with excess leverage that helped 
create the Great Recession?
Note that many real property businesses have 
substantial personal property components (think 
hotels with furniture, TVs, etc.29), making section 
168(k) far from irrelevant. Congress only partially 
addressed this concern through section 168(g)(8), 
which provides that real property businesses that 
elect out of section 163(j) must use the alternative 
depreciation system, but only for residential real 
property, nonresidential real property, and 
qualified improvement property (QIP). QIP is 
essentially the interior remodeling costs of real 
property. That system elongates the depreciation 
term for residential real property from 27½ years 
to 30 years, and for nonresidential real property 
from 39 years to 40 years. That cost is pennies in 
the bigger scheme of things. Section 168(k) 
continues to fully apply to personal property. One 
wonders why Congress even bothered.
Had Congress eliminated section 168(k) 
entirely for electing real property businesses, the 
choice of whether to make the election might have 
been challenging. But now it is hard to see why 
any real property business would not make the 
election, at least under the status quo. QIP, 
however, can throw a wrench into the works. 
Congress apparently intended to provide a 15-
year recovery period for QIP, making it eligible for 
section 168(k), which applies to property with less 
than a 20-year recovery period. Congress failed to 
do that, apparently inadvertently, meaning that 
QIP costs would have to be depreciated over the 
relevant depreciation term for real property. But 
the plot thickens: There has been a (believe it or 
not, somewhat bipartisan) technical correction bill 
in the works that would give QIP the originally 
intended 15-year recovery period, retroactive to 
2018. Given that the election out of section 163(j) 
for real property businesses is irrevocable, the 
possibility of using section 168(k) for QIP could 
make the election decision more than a little 
challenging for some real property businesses 
that plan to do significant remodeling.30
Under section 163(j)(8), ATI means the taxable 
income of the taxpayer, computed without regard 
to:
i.     any item of income, gain, deduction, or 
loss that is not properly allocable to a 
trade or business;
ii.   any BIE or business interest income;
iii.  the amount of any net operating loss   
deduction under section 172;
iv.  the amount of any deduction allowed 
under section 199A;31 and
v.   for tax years beginning before January 
1, 2022, any deduction allowable for 
depreciation, amortization, or 
depletion.
Saying the same thing in a different way, ATI 
is taxable income with the items listed in i-v 




I have been told that some taxpayers treat door locks as personal 
property.
30
See Rev. Proc. 2019-8, 2019-3 IRB 347, for details on how to make the 
election. See also Tony Nitti, “A First Step: Senators Introduce Bill to Fix 
Costly Depreciation Mistake in GOP Tax Law,” Forbes, Mar. 14, 2019. 
Thanks go to professor Deborah A. Geier, who brought me up to speed 
on this issue.
31
Section 199A allows a below-the-line, non-itemized deduction for, 
commonly, 20 percent of specific net business income not earned 
through a C corporation. See Karen C. Burke, “Section 199A and Choice 
of Passthrough Entity,” 72 Tax Law. 551 (2019).
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V. A Tax Shelter by Any Other Name
As noted earlier, the $25 million gross receipts 
exemption does not apply to tax shelters that may 
not use the cash method of accounting under 
section 448(a)(3). One might think one could look 
to section 448 to determine when one has a 
prohibited tax shelter. Indeed, section 448, while 
providing that a tax shelter may not use the cash 
method of accounting (making the statement in 
section 163(j) somewhat redundant), doesn’t 
define a tax shelter at all. Instead, it refers the 
reader to section 461(i)(3), which defines a tax 
shelter as:
A.  any enterprise (other than a C 
corporation) if at any time interests in 
that enterprise have been offered for 
sale in any offering required to be 
registered with any federal or state 
agency having the authority to regulate 
the offering of securities for sale;
B.  any syndicate (within the meaning of 
section 1256(e)(3)(B)); and
C.  any tax shelter (as defined in section 
6662(d)(2)(C)(ii)).32
Most people, lay and professional, would 
define a tax shelter as a venture in which the 
primary objective of the investment is to save 
taxes as opposed to operating a business for 
profit. Registration with a governmental 
authority is irrelevant to this question. Further, 
the reach of this rule could be quite broad 
because, in the IRS’s view, a taxpayer falls within 
the rule even if the securities are exempt from 
registration, for example, under regulation D, 
(which still requires a filing).33 Although few 
smaller partnerships likely issue securities that 
need to be formally registered, issuing securities 
that are exempt from registration under an 
exception like regulation D is quite common.
Under section 1256(e)(3)(B), the term 
“syndicate” means any partnership or other 
entity (other than a corporation that is not an S 
corporation) if more than 35 percent of its losses 
during the tax year are allocable to limited 
partners or limited entrepreneurs (within the 
meaning of section 461(k)(4)). When investment 
capital is being raised from investors who are not 
expected to be active in the business, whether 
limited partners or non-managing members of a 
limited liability company, it is common to allocate 
all or most of the losses to them. As indicated 
earlier, section 704(b) permits this type of 
disproportionate allocation,34 and usually it is 
anything but offensive. In the typical deal, the 
investors are putting up most of the money and 
taking most of the economic risk. Who else should 
be allocated the losses? If they were not allocated 
the early losses, it would be questionable. Why 
allocate losses to those who did not bear the 
economic burden of them? This factor alone 
would not distantly cause one to conclude that a 
tax shelter exists according to a common-sense 
definition of the term.
Many entirely legitimate partnerships will 
meet the section 461(i)(3) definition of a tax shelter 
and thus be unable to take advantage of the $25 
million gross receipts exemption. That may make 
these partnerships less than fully competitive 
with businesses that don’t have passive investors 
or that allocate losses in a manner that stays under 
the 35 percent threshold. One solution would be 
to never allocate passive investors more than 35 
percent of losses, but that would likely be met 
with legitimate resistance from investors, and 
indeed might create an economic distortion if 
losses are allocated to parties who did not bear 
them. Here the tail often will be wagging the dog. 
Legitimate businesses should be allowed to 
negotiate with investors in any way that makes 
sense, and they should not have to factor in an 
irrational loss allocation threshold.
And it gets worse.
Section 6662(d)(2)(C)(ii) defines a tax shelter 
as:
A.  a partnership or other entity;
B.   any investment plan or arrangement; or
C.  any other plan or arrangement, if a 
significant purpose of such partnership, 
entity, plan, or arrangement is the 
avoidance or evasion of federal income 
tax.
32
The rules are somewhat less onerous for farmers. See section 
461(i)(4).
33
See reg. section 1.448-1T(b); and GCM 39781 (1989). Thanks to Alan 
Berkeley of K&L Gates for his words of wisdom in this regard.
34
See Lipton et al., supra note 16, at ch. 5.
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If section 6662(d)(2)(C)(ii) just said “evasion,” 
it would not be objectionable. Tax evasion usually 
is said to exist when a taxpayer deliberately 
avoids paying a true tax liability in a manner that 
constitutes a crime.35 For example, section 7201 
provides:
Any person who willfully attempts in any 
manner to evade or defeat any tax imposed 
by this title or the payment thereof shall, in 
addition to other penalties provided by 
law, be guilty of a felony and, upon 
conviction thereof, shall be fined not more 
than $100,000 ($500,000 in the case of a 
corporation), or imprisoned not more than 
5 years, or both, together with the costs of 
prosecution. [Emphasis added.]
Tax avoidance, on the other hand, usually 
means the legal avoidance of a tax liability.36 That 
legal avoidance might come about because the 
code intentionally gives the taxpayer a given tax 
benefit, or it might be an unintended benefit — 
that is, a tax loophole. As Judge Learned Hand 
famously observed:
Over and over again courts have said that 
there is nothing sinister in so arranging 
one’s affairs as to keep taxes as low as 
possible. Everybody does so, rich or poor; 
and all do right, for nobody owes any 
public duty to pay more than the law 
demands: taxes are enforced exactions, 
not voluntary contributions. To demand 
more in the name of morals is mere cant.37
To state the obvious, legally avoiding taxes 
should not prevent one from taking advantage of 
the $25 million exemption (or any other tax 
benefit).
For section 6662(d)(2)(C)(ii) to apply, the 
evasion or avoidance must be a “significant 
purpose.” That term is not defined in the code or 
the section 6662 regulations, but arguably it is 
fairly common. For example, if investors put up 
the capital for a new enterprise, their long-term 
objectives may be to make a profit, but the near-
term tax benefits likely will be highly relevant. 
Assuming sections 465 and 469 do not impose 
undue hurdles, the ability to deduct near-term 
losses will probably be important to investors and 
likely will be a significant purpose for the 
investment. And not many tax return preparers 
will be willing to advise investors that the tax 
benefits from the near-term were not a significant 
purpose for the investment and risk section 6694 
penalties, even if they might have a valid 
argument.
Example: Assume the partnership agreement 
allocates losses 99 percent to the limited partners 
until partnership income equals partnership 
losses, and then “flips” the allocation to 50 percent 
to the limited partners and 50 percent to the 
general partners. Flips like this are very common 
and, as such, inoffensive. But the partnership 
likely will be seen as a tax shelter under section 
6662. The ability to deduct near-term losses is 
almost certainly a significant factor for the limited 
partners. Thus, a perhaps entirely inoffensive 
partnership will fail to qualify for the $25 million 
exemption.
Also, unlike with a syndicate, section 
6662(d)(2)(C)(ii) can apply when there are no 
passive investors. Even if all the owners of the 
business are active in the business, if they expect 
near-term losses, the ability to deduct those losses 
could be considered significant. The idea that 
persons investing in a business in which they are 
actively involved could be seen as investing in a 
tax shelter if the business loses money in the early 
going is silly on its face. There are countless other 
examples in which legitimate tax savings 
opportunities will at least arguably play a 
significant role. There is simply no logic to this 
fact preventing a taxpayer from using the $25 
million exemption.
That this overbroad definition of tax shelters 
has survived scrutiny is perplexing. Being forced 
onto the accrual method of accounting is no small 
thing. The answer is likely a mundane one: 
Making the definition of a tax shelter more 
rational would probably be scored as a revenue 
loser, and given the large deficits that the federal 
government has been running, it is hard to get a 
revenue loser enacted, regardless of the logic, 
unless it has substantial public support. To date, 
35
See Boris I. Bittker, Martin J. McMahon Jr., and Lawrence A. 
Zelenak, Federal Income Taxation of Individuals, para. 1.03[2] (3d ed. 2003).
36
Id. See also Alan Gunn, “Tax Avoidance,” 76 Mich. L. Rev. 733 (1978).
37
Commissioner v. Newman, 159 F.2d 848, 850-851 (2d Cir. 1947) 
(dissenting opinion); see also Marvin Chirelstein, “Learned Hand’s 
Contribution to the Law of Tax Avoidance,” 77 Yale L.J. 440, 456 (1968).
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that has not been the case for the definition of tax 
shelter.38 Perhaps this will change when section 
163(j)’s potential problem for small business 
becomes clear.
VI. Kafka, Partnerships, and Section 163(j)
A. The Code
In this section, I focus on what new section 
163(j) provides, although an occasional foray into 
the proposed regulations and subchapter K is 
unavoidable. Section 163(j) is a complicated 
section, and its most complicated provisions are 
perhaps those that apply to partnerships in 
section 163(j)(4). Before reviewing section 
163(j)(4), a quick review of a subchapter K rule 
that plays a role in section 163 is in order.
Under section 702, partnerships have to 
separate income and expenses into two 
categories: one for items that can affect different 
partners differently (sometimes called 
“separately stated items”), and one for items that 
do not (commonly called “non-separately stated 
items”). An example of a separately stated item is 
long-term capital gains. Partnership long-term 
capital gains can affect different partners 
differently depending on what other capital gains 
and losses the partners have. Consequently, under 
section 702(a)(2), they must be stated separately 
on the Schedule K-1 given to the partners. Many 
items do not affect partners differently. Under 
section 702(a)(8), these non-separately stated 
items are netted and flow through to the partners 
as a single figure. Before the TCJA, a BIE usually 
would have been an example of a non-separately 
stated item because it typically was an ordinary 
expense item, fully deductible, and did not affect 
different partners differently.
Section 163(j)(4)(A)(i) provides that section 
163(j) is to be applied at the partnership level, and 
that any deduction for a BIE will be taken into 
account in determining the non-separately stated 
taxable income or loss of the partnership. It is not 
clear what the purpose behind this non-separately 
stated provision is. The preamble notes that if a 
BIE that the partnership may deduct is taken into 
account as non-separately stated taxable income 
or loss, that item loses its character as a BIE at the 
partner’s level for purposes of the partner’s 
section 163(j) calculation.39 It is combined with all 
the other non-separately stated items and is not 
subject to further limitations under section 163(j).40
Does that mean that the deductible BIE can 
just be ignored going forward? No — prop. reg. 
section 1.163(j)-6(c) provides that for purposes of 
the code other than section 163(j), BIEs retain their 
character as BIEs at the partner level. For example, 
for purposes of section 469, the interest retains its 
characterization as either passive or non-passive 
when allocated to the partner.41 Accordingly, even 
though BIEs deductible by the partnership under 
section 163(j) are included with the partnership’s 
non-separately stated taxable income and loss, the 
partnership will likely still have to keep track of 
them separately, making it a non-separately stated 
item that is actually separately stated.42
Apparently, there is no legal significance to 
requiring BIEs to be part of non-separately stated 
items. The motivation may have been pragmatic, 
albeit likely created by someone without a deep 
understanding of subchapter K. Calling it non-
separately stated may have been seen as creating 
a sort of firewall to ensure that the section 163(j) 
calculation occurred at the partnership level. 
There were other ways to do that without creating 
a mostly incorrect use of the term “non-separately 
stated taxable income or loss”; but as defects in 
section 163(j) go, this one is fairly trivial.
Inasmuch as section 163(j) is applied at the 
partnership level, ATI must be computed at the 
partnership level. ATI is a term specific to section 
163(j) and is not covered by the flow-through 
rules of section 702. Arguably, then, ATI as such 
cannot flow through to the partners, although its 
component parts certainly could. To the extent 
that the component parts flow through, it could 
permit the double counting of ATI by a partner in 
her own partnership-independent section 163(j) 
calculation if the flow through could increase the 
partner’s ATI. Section 163(j)(4)(A)(ii) addresses 
38
Thanks to Shelly Banoff of Katten Muchin Rosenman LLP for his 
words of wisdom in this regard.
39
See preamble to REG-106089-18, 83 F.R. at 67503.
40
See id. and prop. reg. section 1.163(j)-6(c).
41
See prop. reg. section 1.163(j)-6(c).
42
See prop. reg. section 1.163(j)-3.
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this issue by providing that the ATI “of each 
partner of such partnership — shall be 
determined without regard to such partner’s 
distributive43 [that is, allocable] share of any items 
of income, gain, deduction, or loss of such 
partnership and shall be increased by such 
partner’s distributive share of such partnership’s 
excess taxable income.” I discuss excess taxable 
income (ETI) later.
Calculating a partner’s ATI amount is 
different from calculating his share of partnership 
income for non-section 163(j) purposes. The 
preamble states:
No rule set forth in [the 11 steps] prohibits 
a partnership from making an allocation 
to a partner of any section 163(j) item that 
is otherwise permitted under section 704 
and the regulations thereunder. 
Accordingly, any calculations in [the 
proposed 11 steps] are solely for the 
purpose of determining each partner’s 
deductible BIE and section 163(j) excess 
items [excess BIEs, excess business interest 
income, and ETI — all discussed below] 
and do not otherwise affect any other 
provision under the Code, such as section 
704(b).44
Thus, all items included in partnership ATI 
can be included in a partner’s share of partnership 
income, gain, deduction, or loss for non-section 
163 purposes and, for that matter, adjusted basis. 
In other words, the ATI rules for partners don’t 
somehow trump the rules of subchapter K 
generally. The section 163(j) rules effectively 
overlay the section 704(b) rules to determine 
(among other things) if BIE allocated to a partner 
is deductible, but in no way do they change a 
valid section 704(b) allocation.
The amount of any BIE not allowed as a 
deduction to a partnership for any tax year is not 
treated as business interest paid or accrued by the 
partnership in the succeeding tax year (the 
general rule of section 163(j)(2) for non-
partnership taxpayers). Instead, that amount is 
treated as “excess BIE,” which is allocated to each 
partner in the same manner as the non-separately 
stated taxable income or loss of the partnership — 
again with the non-separately stated piece having 
little meaning. Rather than have the partnership 
treat the disallowed BIE under the general rule of 
section 163(j)(2), that amount is allocated to the 
partners, who will need to keep track of it under 
section 163(j)(4)(B)(ii).
Why give the partnership a BIE deduction but 
effectively transfer any carryforwards to the 
partners? We are not told, but a possible answer is 
that the partners in a partnership can change. 
Optimally, the partners who were members of the 
partnership when the BIE was incurred, but that 
did not get the benefit of a deduction because of 
the section 163(j) limitations, should get the 
benefit of any carryforward. Again, optimally, 
new partners that enter later should not be able to 
benefit from a carryforward that did not arise on 
their watch, to the disadvantage of the continuing 
partners. And as I discuss later, if a partner 
transfers a partnership interest to another, the 
transferee does not get the benefit of a 
carryforward.
If a partner is allocated any excess BIE from a 
partnership, the excess BIE is treated as business 
interest paid or accrued by the partner in the next 
succeeding tax year in which the partner is 
allocated ETI or (in a nonstatutory, regulatory 
addition) “excess business interest income” 
(defined below) from the partnership, but only to 
the extent of those excess income items.45
One may question whether the IRS has the 
authority to allow excess BIEs to be deducted 
from excess business interest income when the 
statute provides only for the deduction from ETI. 
The addition, at least, makes sense: If in the 
current year a taxpayer can deduct BIEs from 
excess business interest income, it is not apparent 
why the taxpayer cannot deduct excess BIE in a 
future year from excess business interest income 
allocated to the partner from the same 
partnership.
Excess business interest income 
unsurprisingly means the amount by which a 
partnership’s business interest income exceeds its 
43
As I tell my students, the term “distributive” is awkward because it 
suggests that distributions are involved. That is not the case in this 
context. In section 702, distributive is synonymous with allocable.
44
See preamble to REG-106089-18, 83 F.R. at 67505.
45
Prop. reg. section 1.163(j)-6(g)(2)(i).
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BIE in a tax year.46 Somewhat confusingly, the 
proposed regulations have “excess business 
interest income” and also “business interest 
income excess.” The two terms appear to be 
synonymous, but the former is calculated at the 
partnership level and the latter is calculated at the 
partner level.47 Even though the meaning appears 
to be the same, the IRS apparently wanted to use 
different terms in different contexts. Perhaps 
nothing is more emblematic of the excessive 
complexity of the statute and the proposed 
regulations than the fact that the IRS felt the need 
to use different terms to say the same thing. Prop. 
reg. section 1.163(j)-6(e)(4) provides that, for 
section 163(j) purposes, a partner may count 
business interest income allocated to it from a 
partnership only to the extent of the partnership’s 
excess business interest income allocated to it 
(plus a floor plan financing interest adjustment). 
This sensibly prevents a double counting of 
business interest income.
Notably, under section 163(j)(4)(b)(ii) and the 
proposed regulations, excess BIE allocated to a 
partner can become deductible only if ETI and 
excess business interest income are allocated to it 
by the same partnership that allocated the excess 
BIE.48 Also, a taxpayer cannot choose the tax year 
in which the excess BIE becomes deductible. To 
the extent that excess BIEs become deductible in a 
given year, the taxpayer must deduct them in that 
year.49 Any portion of that excess BIE remaining is 
treated as BIE paid or accrued by the partner in 
succeeding tax years.
To what extent must ETI be integrated with a 
partner’s personal ATI before the partner can 
calculate the interest deduction? Can excess BIEs 
be deducted from ETI regardless of the other rules 
of section 163(j)? Or, alternatively, does a partner’s 
share of the ETI increase its ATI, after which the 
partner runs through the regular section 163(j) 
rules (that is, deductible up to 30 percent of ATI, 
etc.)? The preamble acknowledges that both 
interpretations are possible, but it chose the latter 
view, arguing that it is more consistent with the 
statutory language.50
Accordingly, under the proposed regulations, 
excess BIE is treated as paid by a partner in the 
year in which the partner is allocated partnership 
ETI or excess business interest income (dollar for 
dollar), and it becomes, as it were, “regular” BIE 
to which section 163(j)(4) no longer applies. The 
ETI increases the partner’s ATI. But the excess 
business interest expense that is now regular BIE 
is deductible only to the extent of 30 percent of the 
partner’s ATI (plus the partner’s business interest 
income — increased for the excess business 
interest income allocated to the partner), that is, 
the regular rule.
Thus, it is a two-track (almost stacking-rule-
like) process. First, excess BIE in the hands of a 
partner is converted to regular BIE to the extent of 
the ETI or excess business interest income 
allocated to that partner. Second, if the now-
regular BIE is not deductible because it exceeds 30 
percent of the partner’s ATI plus the partner’s 
business interest income, it is subject to the 
regular section 163(j)(2) carryforward rules. It is 
carried forward at the partner level and is treated 
as paid in the subsequent year subject to the 
regular, non-partnership section 163(j) rules.51
Example 1: Assume a partner has $10 of 
excess BIE in year 1. In year 2 the partner is 
allocated $20 of ETI, which increases its personal 
ATI by $20. Assume the partner has no other items 
of ATI and no business interest income. Even 
though the partnership rules of the proposed 
regulations no longer limit the partner’s ability to 
deduct the $10 of BIE, the regular rules do. Thirty 
percent of $20 is $6, so only that amount is 
currently deductible by the partner; the 
remaining $4 must be carried forward by the 
partner under section 163(j)(2).
The IRS’s interpretation is not all that close of 
a call, at least if one focuses on the statute. The 
relevant language in section 163(j)(4)(B)(ii)(I) 
reads:
If a partner is allocated excess business 
interest [expense] from a partnership . . . 
46
Prop. reg. section 1.163(j)-6(b)(4).
47
For business interest income excess, see prop. reg. section 1.163(j)-
6(f)(2)(iii).
48
See also prop. reg. section 1.163(j)-6(g)(2).
49
See prop. reg. section 1.163(j)-6(g)(3); and preamble to REG-106089-
18, 83 F.R. at 67508.
50
Preamble to REG-106089-18, 83 F.R. at 67508.
51
Prop. reg. section 1.163(j)-6(g)(3); and preamble to REG-106089-18, 
83 F.R. at 67508.
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for any taxable year — such excess 
business interest [expense] shall be treated 
as business interest paid or accrued by the 
partner in the next succeeding taxable year 
in which the partner is allocated ETI from 
such partnership, but only to the extent of 
such ETI. [Emphasis in original.]
This language does not state that a partner 
receives a deduction to the extent of the ETI, but 
only that BIE is considered to be paid to that 
extent. There is some language in the legislative 
history, however, that could be interpreted to 
favor the other interpretation — that is, that a 
partner may deduct a dollar of excess BIE for each 
dollar of ETI allocated to the partner: “The partner 
may deduct its share of the partnership’s excess 
business interest in any future year, but only 
against ETI attributed to the partner by the 
partnership the activities of which gave rise to the 
excess business interest carryforward.”52 This may 
be a case of sloppy drafting, because there is much 
logic to the IRS’s approach, as I hope to explicate.
How is ETI defined? Section 163(j)(4)(C) 
defines it in a decidedly complex way. ETI means 
the amount that bears the same ratio to the 
partnership’s ATI as (1) the excess (if any) of the 30 
percent of ATI limit over; and (2) the amount (if 
any) by which the BIE of the partnership, reduced 
by the floor plan financing interest, exceeds the 
business interest income of the partnership bears 
to the 30 percent of ATI limit.53 Putting this into an 
algebraic equation in which one solves for X, X/
ATI = (0.3 ATI - (BIE - business interest income))/
0.3 ATI. BIE - business interest income cannot be 
less than zero.
For example, assume in the current year that 
the partnership has ATI of $300,000. Thirty 
percent of ATI is $90,000. The partnership incurs 
$50,000 of BIE, $10,000 of business interest 
income, and zero of floor financing interest. The 
$50,000 of the BIE is currently deductible by the 
partnership because it is less than 30 percent of 
ATI plus the business interest income, which adds 
up to $100,000. The BIE of $50,000 exceeds the 
business interest income of $10,000 by $40,000. Do 
the latter half of the equation first: ($90,000 - 
($50,000 - $10,000))/$90,000 = 0.555. ETI is thus ATI 
of $300,000 x 0.555 = $166,666. That amount 
increases the partners’ ATI.
Assume further that the partnership in prior 
years had $200,000 of BIE disallowed, which it 
allocated to the partners as excess BIE under 
section 164(j)(4)(B), and that no ETI or excess 
business interest income has been allocated to the 
partners before the current year. The partners 
must treat $166,666 of the $200,000 of the excess 
BIE as currently paid, subject to the regular rules. 
Any amount they cannot deduct is now outside 
section 163(j)(4) and carried forward under 
163(j)(2). It is no longer part of the ETI system. The 
remaining amount of $33,333 of excess BIE awaits 
further allocation of ETI or excess business 
interest income to the partners.
The ETI equation, in addition to being 
complex, seemingly can generate odd outcomes. 
The right side of the equation, with its focus on 30 
percent of ATI, appears to be meant to capture 
how much unused ATI limit the partnership has. 
But at first blush, there appears to be something 
amiss. Under the equation, ATI equals ETI when 
the partnership does not incur a BIE. If a 
partnership has $100,000 of ATI, but no BIE, ETI 
will be $100,000. But if the partnership also incurs 
$10,000 of BIE and no business interest income, 
ETI dramatically drops to $66,666. It is hard to see 
why a BIE that is 10 percent of ATI should cause a 
one-third drop in ETI. The ETI of a partnership is 
presumably intended to represent the amount of 
ATI not needed to permit the partnership to 
deduct its BIE under the section 163(j) rules.54 That 
being the case, why not simply have ETI equal to 
the amount by which ATI exceeds the allowed BIE 
deduction (net of business interest income)? Thus, 
if there is $100,000 of ATI and $10,000 of BIE, ETI 
would be $90,000, not just $66,666.
But if one looks at the partners and the 
partnership together, the equation holds up 
better.55 For example, assume that in 2018 a 
partnership has $20,000 of BIE, no ATI, and no 
52
H.R. Rep. No. 115-466, at 391 (2017).
53
The proposed regulations track this definition. See prop. reg. 
section 1.163(j)-1(b)(15).
54
See Kevin Anderson et al., “Section 163(j) Proposed Regulations 
Applications for S Corporations Wednesday,” ABA Webinar (July 24, 
2019).
55
Thanks go to professor Fred Brown, who originally developed a 
version of this example. Query why the IRS did not provide such an 
example.
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business interest income, and thus allocates 
$20,000 excess BIE to its partners. In 2019 the 
partnership has $10,000 of BIE, no business 
interest income, and $76,666 of ATI. All $10,000 of 
BIE would be deductible under section 163(j) and 
flow through to partners. The maximum amount 
of BIE that could have been deducted by the 
partnerships is 30 percent of $76,666 or about 
$23,000. But the partnership only deducted 
$10,000 of BIE, leaving, as it were, $13,000 of 
unused ATI.
If the system works properly, when ETI is 
allocated to the partners, it should permit them to 
deduct BIE up to $13,000 ($23,000 - $13,000). 
Under the statutory formula, assuming the 
partnership deducted only $10,000 of BIE, ETI is 
$43,332, which increases the partners’ ATI. The 
partners could then deduct BIEs up to 30 percent 
of that, or — voilà — about $13,000. Thus, both the 
way ETI is calculated under the statute, and the 
IRS’s interpretation of how it should operate at the 
partner-level, make good sense if the partnership 
and the partner are viewed together, as they 
should be in this context.
Although the IRS got the calculation of ETI 
right, it got the application of ETI wrong in the 
section 743(b) context. I discuss this issue in Part 
2, in my examination of Example 8 of the 
proposed regulations.
Notably, how ETI is allocated to a partner is 
not truly optional, unlike the allocation of BIEs, a 
topic to which I return in Part 2 when I discuss the 
11 steps. For now, note that the allocation of ETI 
generally tracks the allocation of positive ATI to 
partners.
The proposed regulations respect the 
partnership’s allocation of BIEs as such; they 
never change the partnership’s allocation of BIEs. 
If the partnership’s BIE is not fully deductible, the 
partnership does not have unbridled discretion 
about which partner is allocated deductible BIE 
and which is allocated excess BIEs. I return to this 
topic in Part 2 when discussing the examples in 
the proposed regulations, but generally, to have a 
current deduction, the partner must also have 
been allocated positive ATI. Partners that were not 
allocated positive ATI are likely to have the 
allocated BIE classified as excess BIE, at least in 
part.
A remaining issue is basis adjustments. Under 
section 163(j)(4)(B)(iii), the adjusted basis of a 
partner in a partnership interest is reduced (but 
not below zero) not just by the currently 
deductible BIEs, but also by the amount of excess 
BIE allocated to the partner. This is fair enough if 
the partner is allowed to eventually deduct the 
excess BIE. The statute could have provided that 
the basis is reduced only when the interest is 
deductible by the partner, but that might have 
created tracking issues. Procedurally, it is easier to 
reduce the basis when the excess BIE is allocated 
to the partner rather than keep track of it over 
time and reduce basis down the road. Under the 
proposed regulations, gain or loss from the sale of 
the partnership interest adjusts ATI.56
What if the partner does not get to deduct all 
the excess BIE before disposing of the partnership 
interest? Section 163(j)(4)(iii) and prop. reg. 
section 1.163(j)-6(h)(3) come to the rescue, 
providing that if a partner disposes of its 
partnership interest in a taxable or nontaxable 
transaction (including death), its adjusted basis in 
the partnership interest (outside basis) is increased 
immediately before the disposition by any excess 
business interest that was allocated to that partner 
but not yet “converted” (that is, treated as paid by 
the partner).57 Of course, no deduction is allowed 
to the transferor or transferee for any excess BIE 
that increased outside basis.
Example 2: Assume $20,000 of excess BIE is 
allocated to Partner A, who sells his partnership 
interest in a fully taxable transaction to new 
Partner X before any of the $20,000 is converted. A 
will have a $20,000 basis increase in his 
56
Prop. reg. section 1.163(j)-6(e)(3), assuming the partnership holds 
only non-excepted trade or business assets. If the partnership does hold 
excepted assets, prop. reg. section 1.163(j)-10(b)(4)(ii) generally provides 
for a proportionate apportionment of the gain or loss between excepted 
and non-excepted assets. The IRS also considered adopting a reasonable 
method standard by which a partnership could determine the amount 
properly allocable to a non-excepted trade or business and therefore 
properly includable in the partner’s ATI. These provisions would have 
adopted tracing rules similar to those in reg. section 1.163-8T, as 
modified by Notice 88-20, 1988-1 C.B. 487; Notice 88-37, 1988-1 C.B. 522; 
and Notice 89-35, 1989-1 C.B. 675. The IRS has requested comments in 
this regard.
57
Also, prop. reg. section 1.163(j)-6(h)(2) provides that any “negative 
section 163(j) expense” will remain negative section 163(j) expense of the 
transferor partner until the expense is no longer suspended under 
section 704(d). (See the discussion of prop. reg. section 1.163(j)-6(o), 
examples 9 and 10 in Part 2, Section VI.B.2, and accompanying note 18.) 
These rules are similar to the rules found under section 469 and its 
regulations concerning suspended passive activity loss deductions. See 
preamble to REG-106089-18, 83 F.R. at 67509.
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partnership interest, and the excess BIE will never 
be deductible. To that extent, A will have less gain 
or more loss on the sale. The character of A’s gain 
or loss will depend on how sections 741 and 
751(a) apply to the sale, but typically the basis 
increase will reduce capital gains or increase 
capital losses recognized by A on the sale of the 
partnership interest.58
Note that this does not make Partner A even, 
because a downstream deduction of the $20,000 
would have reduced higher-taxed ordinary 
income. Does the entire partnership interest have 
to be transferred? The statute implies that, but it 
does not state it explicitly. But the adjustment 
does not make much sense (possibly even for the 
partner, who may be forgoing an ordinary income 
deduction) unless at least almost all the interest is 
transferred. The proposed regulations do not 
contain a formal de minimis rule, but they do 
provide that the adjustment occurs if a partner 
transfers “all or substantially all” of the interest. 
Thus, it appears that if a partner disposes of most 
of a partnership interest but retains a small 
portion — say, 1 percent — a basis adjustment 
should still occur. Caution should be exercised 
because we don’t reliably know what the 
“substantially all” threshold is.
As indicated above, the ability to deduct the 
excess BIE is personal to the taxpayer and cannot 
be carried over to a transferee. But, for example, in 
a gift transfer, a donee can get the benefit of the 
basis increase provided by section 163(j)(4)(iii) 
and prop. reg. section 1.163(j)-6(h)(3).59
Of course, the first mode of defense is to 
avoid the section 163(j)/partnership mess 
entirely, if possible. More sophisticated 
businesses may seek to “place” debt in a way that 
takes it outside the partnership rules, 
particularly when a partnership acquires a 
portfolio company operating as a C corporation 
(an S corporation cannot have a partnership as a 
partner under section 1361(b)). Pre-TCJA 
businesses may have generally placed the debt 
with the operations, but now they should 
consider whether it’s best to place it in the 
corporate entity if nontax considerations make it 
optional.60 Avoiding all the partnership 
complications and possible compliance burdens 
would be a major incentive. 
58
Section 751(a) may cause the partner to recognize (typically) 
ordinary income on a disposition of a partnership interest to the extent 
of the partner’s share of (typically) ordinary income inherent in accounts 
receivables, inventory, and some other ordinary income assets. Section 
751(a) does not apply to interest deductions. The application of section 
751(a) can be complex, but at a minimum it can be said that the basis 
increase provided by section 163(j)(4)(iii) will most likely affect section 
741 gain or loss, i.e., capital gain or loss.
59
If there is a loss inherent in the interest at the time of the gift, its 
deductibility may be restricted. See section 1015.
60
Emily L. Foster, “Business Interest Limitation Muddles Private 
Equity Investments,” Tax Notes Federal, Aug. 19, 2019, p. 1293.
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